

REMUNERATION POLICIES FOR THE EXECUTIVE CORPORATE OFFICERS APPROVED BY THE SHAREHOLDERS AT THE GENERAL MEETING HELD ON 25 APRIL 2024

In accordance with the provisions of articles R. 22-10-14 IV of the French Commercial Code (*Code de commerce*), the remuneration policies for the executive corporate officers approved by the Ordinary General Meeting of shareholders held on 25 April 2024 (resolutions n°9 and 10 adopted at 99,58 % and 99,95%) are set out below.

REMUNERATION POLICIES FOR THE EXECUTIVE CORPORATE OFFICERS

1. Underlying principles of the remuneration policies for executive corporate officers

In accordance with the legal framework set out in articles L. 22-10-8 *et seq.* of the French Commercial Code, the remuneration policies for the executive corporate officers for 2024 were approved by the Board of Directors on the recommendation of the Appointments, Remuneration and CSR Committee at the Board's meeting on 27 February 2024.

The same procedure will be followed for any subsequent revision of the remuneration policies.

The role of the Appointments, Remuneration and CSR Committee, comprising only independent members and an employee director, is to ensure that there are no conflicts of interest when preparing, reviewing and implementing the remuneration policies.

The aim of these remuneration policies for executive corporate officers is to achieve – through their various components – a fair balance, commensurate with the work performed and the level of responsibility, between a lump-sum, recurring portion (**annual fixed remuneration**), and a portion directly related to the operating environment, strategy and performance of the Group (**annual variable remuneration and performance shares**).

Within the variable portion, a balance is also sought between the portion based on short-term objectives (**annual variable remuneration** contingent on performance for the year concerned) and the portion based on long-term objectives (**free shares** subject to performance conditions assessed over a minimum period of three consecutive years, with the vesting period

followed by a holding period of no less than two years). The aim of these performance share awards is to closely align the executive corporate officers' interests with those of the Company's shareholders in terms of long-term value creation.

The underlying performance criteria applicable to both the annual variable remuneration and the performance shares are mainly **quantitative financial criteria**, which are key indicators of the Group's overall health. These criteria are a way of assessing the Group's intrinsic performance, i.e., its year-on-year progress, based on internal indicators that are directly correlated with the Group's strategy.

The variable remuneration of the executive corporate officers is also contingent on **quantitative non-financial criteria** related to the Group's key commitments under its **corporate social responsibility policy**, including the recognition of **climate issues**, which apply both to the short-term portion (**annual variable remuneration**) and the long-term portion (**performance shares**). The inclusion of these non-financial criteria is also designed to encourage a **model of steady, sustainable growth** that mirrors the Group's corporate values and **respects the environment** in which it operates.

The annual variable remuneration of the executive corporate officers also includes a portion contingent on **qualitative criteria**, based on a set of specific priority targets assigned each year.

In addition, executive corporate officers have a conditional right to receive **a supplementary pension** in addition to benefits under the basic state pension system. This benefit is taken into account when calculating their overall remuneration.

Lastly, **on a very exceptional basis, bonuses** may be awarded, under terms and conditions that always comply with best corporate governance principles and practices.

In light of all these elements, the executive corporate officers do not receive:

- ▶ **multi-annual variable remuneration in cash;**
- ▶ **benefits linked to taking up or terminating office;**
- ▶ **benefits linked to non-competition agreements.**

Furthermore, Arnaud Lagardère, who is a significant shareholder of Lagardère SA, does not receive any free share awards or other share options, as his stake in the Company automatically guarantees that his actions over the long term will be closely aligned with the interests of shareholders, of which he is one.

Beyond the application of market practices, the remuneration policy for executive corporate officers takes account of the remuneration and employment conditions of Company and Group personnel. Accordingly, 45% of Group employees have a variable component in their overall annual remuneration. Similarly, in accordance with best corporate governance practices, the Lagardère SA free share plans are

not just restricted to executive corporate officers and senior managers. They also cover some 400 Group employees, notably young high-potential managers identified during the talent management process (see section 3.8.9 below). For a portion of the beneficiaries of these plans, free shares are allocated subject to the achievement of the same performance conditions as those applicable to the Deputy Chief Executive Officer. In 2023, Lagardère even extended free share plans to all of the Group's employees, by awarding 50 rights to free shares under the We Share Lagardère plan to all employees with at least two years' seniority who work a minimum of 50% of their working hours for the Group.

The overall policy implemented is designed to ensure **reasonable, fair and balanced remuneration**, and to create a **strong correlation between the interests of the executive corporate officers and the interests of the Company, its shareholders and all stakeholders**, tailored to the Group's strategy and its **performance objectives**.

The Appointments, Remuneration and CSR Committee reviewed these remuneration policies in order to assess their alignment with the rules of good governance, the French financial markets authority (AMF) and French corporate governance council (HCGE) recommendations on governance, and proxy advisory firm policies and discussions. This led the Committee to recommend to the Board changes to remuneration policies. The main changes proposed are described in the table below:

Summary of proposed changes to remuneration policies for executive corporate officers

<p>Remuneration structures for the executive corporate officers</p>	<p>Alignment of the structure of the executive corporate officers' remuneration with market practices</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Elimination of the method for calculating executive corporate officers' variable remuneration based on a benchmark amount unrelated to fixed remuneration (as a reminder: €1,426,000 for the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer and €600,000 for the Deputy Chief Executive Officer). ▶ Increase in the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer's fixed remuneration (unchanged since 2009), from €1,140,729 to €1,700,000.
	<p>Changes to the structure of annual variable remuneration</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Setting a minimum, target and maximum level of variable remuneration for each of the performance criteria, thereby avoiding (i) any payment in the event of underperformance and (ii) any offsetting effect between the criteria. ▶ Reduction in the maximum percentage the qualitative portion of variable remuneration can represent of fixed remuneration from 30% to 22.5% for the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer and from 25% to 11.25% for the Deputy Chief Executive Officer. ▶ Reduction in the maximum percentage the annual variable remuneration of the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer can represent of his fixed remuneration from 200% to 150%.
<p>Long-term remuneration for the Deputy Chief Executive Officer</p>	<p>Alignment of performance criteria with the Company's strategy</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Replacement of the non-financial criterion based on the proportion of women on executive bodies by a criterion based on employee anti-corruption training. ▶ Replacement of the financial criterion based on ROCE (Return on Capital Employed) with a criterion based on recurring operating profit of fully consolidated companies (recurring EBIT). ▶ Change in the weighting of the three non-financial criteria to give them equal weighting of 10% each.

The Board of Directors may decide to make exceptions as to the application of the remuneration policies by adjusting, on the advice of the Appointments, Remuneration and CSR Committee, the objectives set and/or certain criteria applicable to the executive corporate officers' annual variable remuneration or long-term incentive instruments, provided that any such adjustment is justified by exceptional circumstances, such as a change in accounting standards, a material change in scope, the completion of a transformational

transaction, a substantial change in market conditions, or an unexpected development in the competitive landscape. Any such modification of the objectives and/or criteria with the aim of ensuring that the actual performance of the Group and of the executive corporate officer continues to be reflected, would be made public and justified, notably with regard to the Group's corporate interests. In all circumstances, the payment variable remuneration remains subject to the approval of the shareholders.

2. Components of remuneration for executive corporate officers


2.1 Short-term remuneration components

A) ANNUAL FIXED REMUNERATION

Annual fixed remuneration is paid in 12 equal monthly instalments over the year.

The amount of this fixed remuneration reflects the responsibilities, skills and experience of the executive corporate officer, and is reviewed at relatively long intervals in accordance with the recommendations of the Afep-Medef Code.

B) ANNUAL VARIABLE REMUNERATION



Annual variable remuneration is calculated by reference to **a combination of specific criteria – both financial and non-financial – directly correlated with the Group's strategy**. Annual variable remuneration is also subject to a **cap expressed as a maximum percentage of fixed remuneration** for the same fiscal year.

In accordance with article L. 22-10-34 II of the French Commercial Code, the variable remuneration of the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer and Deputy Chief Executive Officer may only be paid following the approval of the General Meeting of shareholders.

Weighting of criteria and assessment of achievement levels

The structure of executive corporate officers' annual variable remuneration is based on the following three categories of criteria:

- ▶ **quantitative financial criteria (70% of annual variable remuneration);**
- ▶ **quantitative non-financial CSR criteria (15% of annual variable remuneration);** and
- ▶ **qualitative criteria (15% of annual variable remuneration).**

In full compliance with the recommendations of the Afep-Medef Code and the rules of good governance, **both financial criteria and quantitative criteria** – accounting for 85% of annual variable compensation – **are clearly predominant**.

The performance criteria are set by the Board of Directors, on the advice of the Appointments, Remuneration and CSR Committee, so as to be demanding and consistent in terms of both the Group's historical performance and changes in its operating environment.

To avoid any offsetting effect between performance criteria, a maximum level is set for each criterion, beyond which outperformance is no longer remunerated.

Quantitative financial criteria

Based on the recommendation of the Appointments, Remuneration and CSR Committee, at its meeting of 27 February 2024 the Board of Directors decided to maintain the same criteria as those of the previous year in order to assess the officers' performance over the long term and to adopt financial performance criteria corresponding to the key indicators of the Group's financial health, i.e.:

- ▶ **free cash flow (30% of the variable portion);**
- ▶ **recurring operating profit of fully consolidated companies (recurring EBIT) (25% of the variable portion);**
- ▶ **operating margin (15% of the variable portion).**

For each of these criteria, the Board of Directors approves a precise "trigger level", "target level" and "maximum level" for the objectives, in line with the provisional consolidated budget adopted by the Board. Due to the confidential nature of these objectives, which relate to the

budget and/or to the Group's internal goals (themselves not public knowledge), this information is not disclosed in advance. However, these trigger, target and maximum levels for objectives, as well as the levels actually achieved for each of the financial criteria, will be disclosed in the Corporate Governance Report to be published in 2025 for the 2024 financial year.

For each of these three criteria:

- ▶ no remuneration is paid below the trigger level;
- ▶ remuneration is calculated on a linear basis between the trigger and target levels and between the target and maximum levels;
- ▶ no outperformance beyond the maximum level is remunerated.

Quantitative non-financial CSR criteria

Based on the recommendation of the Appointments, Remuneration and CSR Committee, at its meeting of 27 February 2024, the Board of Directors decided to maintain the same criteria as those of the previous year in order to assess their performance over the long term.

Three quantitative non-financial CSR criteria underlie the executive corporate officers' annual variable remuneration. The criteria are related to the Group's priority commitments under its corporate social responsibility policy, in particular climate issues. For each of these three criteria, the Board of Directors validates, on the advice issued by the Appointments, Remuneration and CSR Committee, the "trigger level", "target level" and "maximum level" for the objectives, in line with the Group's priority commitments. Each of the three criteria selected must be **relevant** to the Group's CSR roadmap, be **measurable and monitored over time** using reliable tools, be **subject to specific due diligence by the Company's sustainability auditors**, and be disclosed in the annual financial report.

Accordingly, for 2024, the three criteria adopted along with the associated weightings are:

- ▶ **environmental (6% of the variable portion): the reduction in Lagardère's carbon footprint, as measured by the rate of carbon emissions from Scopes 1 & 2 and, partially, Scope 3 as a ratio of the workforce** (indirect emissions corresponding to business travel and commuting);
- ▶ **ethical (6% of the variable portion): promoting ethical and responsible governance, as measured by the Group's regular assessment of the environmental, social and ethical performance of its suppliers and subcontractors;**
- ▶ **social (3% of the variable portion): improved gender balance in executive bodies and in senior positions of responsibility, as measured by the proportion of women top executives.**

For each of these three criteria:

- ▶ no remuneration is paid below the trigger level;
- ▶ remuneration is calculated on a linear basis between the trigger and target levels and between the target and maximum levels;
- ▶ no outperformance beyond the maximum level is remunerated.

Qualitative criteria

Based on the recommendation of the Appointments, Remuneration and CSR Committee, the Board of Directors decided to maintain the qualitative criteria based on the following two areas, each with equal weighting:

- ▶ **rollout of the Group's strategic plan (7.5% of the variable portion);**
- ▶ **quality of governance and management (7.5% of the variable portion)**, covering (i) actions to motivate and retain talent and (ii) the effective engagement of General Management in the deployment of compliance, risk management and corruption prevention programmes.

The performance levels achieved in these two areas are assessed by the Board of Directors, based on the recommendations of the

Appointments, Remuneration and CSR Committee.

The **qualitative portion** of annual variable remuneration is also subject to a **cap expressed as a maximum percentage of fixed remuneration** for the same fiscal year.

Clawback clause

The remuneration policy for corporate officers includes a clawback clause. This clause allows some or all of the annual variable remuneration paid to the officers to be "clawed back" under exceptional and serious circumstances.

The clawback clause is designed as an effective means of aligning the interests of management with those of shareholders. It can be activated in the exceptional event that, in the two years following payment of the annual variable remuneration, the financial data on which it was based are found to have been demonstrably and intentionally distorted. The amount clawed back in this case would represent the sums impacted by the fraud.

C) REMUNERATION FOR DUTIES ON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Like the other members of the Board of Directors, the executive corporate officers may be remunerated for their duties on the Board and on its committees, in accordance with the rules set out in the remuneration policy for members of the Board of Directors described in section 3.6 below.

2.2 Long-term remuneration components – performance share awards

The executive corporate officers may be awarded performance shares on a yearly basis.

These awards are decided after publication of the Group's results for the previous year. Their terms and conditions are set by the Board of Directors and the Appointments, Remuneration and CSR Committee. The terms and conditions in force are described below.

Holding period for vested performance shares:

▶ 100% of the vested shares must be held in a registered account (*nominatif pur*) for a period

of two years, although there is no legal obligation to do so. At the end of this two-year period;

▶ 25% of the vested shares must be held in a registered account (*nominatif pur*) until the beneficiary ceases their duties as an executive corporate officer;

▶ 25% of the vested shares must be held in a registered account (*nominatif pur*) until the value of the Lagardère SA shares held equals at least one year's worth of the executive corporate officer's gross variable remuneration. This value is assessed each year based on (i) the average Lagardère SA share price for the month of December of the previous year and (ii) the fixed and variable remuneration due in respect of the past year, with the theoretical maximum level being used for the variable portion;

▶ each executive corporate officer eligible to receive performance shares formally agrees not to enter into transactions to hedge risks associated with their performance shares during the holding period;

▶ at the close of the mandatory holding periods, the corresponding shares become transferable and can be traded under the terms and conditions established by law and regulations and in accordance with the black-out periods established by Lagardère SA in its Confidentiality and Market Ethics Charter.

Vesting conditions:

Performance conditions

The performance conditions are based on criteria representing **key indicators used for the Group's strategy**, which ensure that the beneficiaries' interests are closely aligned with those of the Company and its stakeholders.

The criteria are all quantitative criteria and are assessed over a minimum period of three consecutive fiscal years, including the fiscal year during which the performance shares are awarded (the "reference period").

Both the criteria themselves and the target and trigger levels set for each criterion are approved by the Board of Directors on the basis of recommendations put forward by the

Appointments, Remuneration and CSR Committee. The criteria used must be relevant to the Group's strategy, measurable and monitored over time using reliable systems, and subject to independent verification.

The performance criteria applicable under the 2024-2026 performance share plan will be as follows:

► **For 25% of the performance shares awarded:** the achievement during the reference period of a pre-defined **cumulative amount of recurring operating profit of fully consolidated companies (recurring EBIT)**.

► **For 25% of the performance shares awarded:** the achievement during the reference period of a pre-defined **cumulative amount of free cash flow**.

This criterion, also unchanged, which reflects the Group's capacity to finance its investments and pay dividends, is also a key indicator of the Group's financial health.

► **For 20% of the performance shares awarded:** the achievement during the reference period of a pre-defined **operating margin rate**.

This indicator is calculated by dividing recurring operating profit of fully consolidated companies (Group recurring EBIT) by revenue, reflecting the profitability of the business, and is also a key indicator used to direct the Group's performance.

For each of these three financial objectives, the Board of Directors, on the advice of the Appointments, Remuneration and CSR Committee and in line with the provisional consolidated budget it adopted, approves the following:

- the "target level" to be reached for 100% of the shares allocated to the objective to vest, and
- the "trigger level", corresponding to the level (i) above which 0% to 100% of the shares allocated to the objective will vest (determined on a straight-line basis) and (ii) below which no shares will vest. The trigger level cannot be lower than 66% of the target level.

► **For 30% of the performance shares awarded:** the achievement of precise objectives based on three quantitative criteria related to the Group's priority commitments under its **corporate social responsibility** policy based on the following weightings:

- **environmental (10%):**

► **the reduction in Lagardère's carbon footprint, as measured by the rate of carbon emissions from Scopes 1 & 2 and, partially, Scope 3 as a ratio of the workforce,**

- **ethical (20%):**

► **promoting ethical and responsible governance, as measured by the Group's regular assessment of the environmental, social and ethical performance of its suppliers and subcontractors (10%),**

► **providing anti-corruption training for employees (10%).**

For each of these three non-financial objectives, the Board of Directors, further to the approval of the Appointments, Remuneration and CSR Committee, validates the following:

- the "target level" to be reached for 100% of the shares allocated to the objective to vest; and
- the "trigger level", corresponding to the level (i) above which 0% to 100% of the shares allocated to the objective will vest (determined on a straight-line basis) and (ii) below which no shares will vest. The trigger level cannot be lower than 66% of the target level.

The target and trigger levels are set so as to be demanding and consistent in terms of both the Group's historical performance and changes in its operating environment.

Presence condition

In order for the performance shares to vest, the Deputy Chief Executive Officer must **still be an executive corporate officer of Lagardère SA** three years after the award date.

In respect of this presence condition, rights to performance shares are:

- ▶ forfeited if the executive corporate officer resigns, is dismissed or removed from office due to misconduct before the end of this three-year period;
- ▶ retained in full in the event his office is terminated ahead of term due to death or incapacity before the end of this three-year period;
- ▶ retained in part on a pro rata basis if the executive corporate officer retires or is dismissed or removed from office for reasons other than misconduct before the end of this three-year period.

Note that the performance conditions continue to apply in any event.

The rights to free shares are partly retained on a *pro rata basis* in the specific cases of retirement or forced departure for reasons other than misconduct, because they are an essential component of the executive corporate officer's annual remuneration and are awarded in consideration for duties performed in the year that the rights are awarded. The partial retention of these rights, which continue to be subject to achieving demanding long-term performance conditions, encourages the executive corporate officer to act in the long-term interests of the Group.

Consequently, all of the terms and conditions of the Company's performance share awards fully comply with the recommendations in the Afep-Medef Code. This is the case for (i) the applicable **performance conditions, which are solely based on quantitative criteria and combine financial and non-financial criteria, all corresponding to key indicators for the Company's strategy**, and (ii) the other terms and conditions (number of shares, vesting period, holding period etc.). All of these terms and conditions combined ensure that the

performance share awards are a way of retaining the beneficiaries concerned and closely aligning their interests with those of the Company and its stakeholders.

2.3 Other benefits

A) BENEFITS IN KIND – BUSINESS EXPENSES

The executive corporate officers are provided with a company car, the potential personal use of which corresponds to a benefit in kind.

Other benefits in kind may be provided in specific situations.

The executive corporate officers are also entitled to the reimbursement of business travel and business entertainment expenses incurred in connection with their executive duties.

B) SUPPLEMENTARY PENSION PLAN

The executive corporate officers are eligible for a supplementary pension plan operated by Lagardère Management. This is a defined supplementary benefit plan as provided for in article 39 of the French Tax Code (*Code général des impôts*) and article L. 137-11 of the French Social Security Code (*Code de la sécurité sociale*).

In accordance with French Government Order no. 2019-697 dated 3 July 2019, which reformed the statutory supplementary pension plan regime in France, **this plan was closed to new entrants as from 4 July 2019, and benefits accrued under the plan were frozen as at 31 December 2019.** No further benefits will be accrued under the plan as from that date.

The plan is a conditional benefit plan, and the pension will only be payable if the beneficiary is still with the company at retirement age, except in the event of (i) termination (other than for serious misconduct) after the age of 55 providing the beneficiary does not take up another post, (ii) long-term disability, or (iii) early retirement. In addition, beneficiaries are required to have been members of the Executive Committee for at least five years at the date that they retire.

In the event of the beneficiary's death, 60% of the pension is transferable to a surviving spouse.

Before the plan was frozen at 31 December 2019, its beneficiaries accrued supplementary pension entitlements at a rate equal to 1.75% of the benchmark remuneration per year of membership of the plan.

The benchmark remuneration corresponded to the average gross annual remuneration over the last five years (fixed + variable up to a maximum of 100% of the fixed portion). In addition, each annual remuneration could not exceed 50 times the annual limit defined by the French social security system i.e., a maximum amount of €2,026,200 in 2019. Each beneficiary's benchmark remuneration was frozen at 31 December 2019.

As the number of years of plan membership used to calculate the benefit entitlements was capped at 20, the supplementary pension could not exceed 35% of the benchmark remuneration.

The pension entitlements were fully borne by the Company and this benefit was taken into account in determining the overall remuneration of the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer.

Under current social security laws (article L. 137-11 of the French Commercial Code), the Company is required to pay a contribution equal to 32% of the amount of the benefits, at the time that such benefits are paid.

In addition to the tax and social security contributions applicable to pensions (levied at a rate of 10.1%, of which 5.9% is tax-deductible), under current tax and social security laws, the annuities that will be paid to the beneficiaries will also be subject to the specific contribution provided for in article L. 137-11-1 of the French Social Security Code, before income tax withheld at source and any surtaxes on high incomes.

At its meeting on 27 February 2024, on the recommendation of the Appointments, Remuneration and CSR Committee, the Board of Directors decided to continue with the "vested benefits" supplementary pension plan which was set up for the last three previous fiscal years, in accordance with the legal framework introduced by article L. 137-11-2 of the French Social Security Code. The main features of this

pension plan, as set out in the remuneration policy approved by the General Meeting of 22 April 2022, are described below.

This is an individual rather than collective plan and is "portable", in that the benefits will be attached to the employee and will be carried over even in case of a change of employer.

The characteristics of this supplementary pension plan fully comply with applicable legislation and with the recommendations of the Afep-Medef Corporate Governance Code.

Under this plan, the supplementary pension benefits will vest to the executive corporate officers at a rate of 1.25% of the benchmark remuneration each year.

The benchmark remuneration corresponds to the gross annual remuneration (fixed + variable) paid during the year, and cannot exceed 50 times the annual ceiling used to calculate social security contributions.

Since the maximum vesting period is 20 years, the accumulated rights are capped at 25%.

In the event of the beneficiary's death, 60% of the pension is transferable to a surviving spouse.

In accordance with applicable legislation, vesting is subject to performance conditions that require an achievement rate of at least 75% for the annual financial and non-financial targets used to determine the executive corporate officers' annual variable remuneration.

C) TERMINATION BENEFIT

Corporate officers are entitled to termination benefits.


D) EXTRAORDINARY REMUNERATION

Bonuses may be granted to the executive corporate officers in very specific and exceptional circumstances, notably in connection with one-off transactions requiring extensive involvement of the executive corporate officers, particularly when the impacts of such transactions, despite being extremely significant for the Group, cannot be taken into account in determining the variable portion of their remuneration.

The conditions of any extraordinary remuneration awards and payments are determined in accordance with best corporate governance practices.

Any extraordinary remuneration award, which must be disclosed and justified in detail, may not in any case exceed 150% of the annual fixed remuneration of the executive corporate officers.

3. Specific application of the 2024 remuneration policy to Arnaud Lagardère, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer



Fixed remuneration

On 27 February 2024, the Board of Directors, on the recommendation of the Appointments, Remuneration and CSR Committee, decided to increase **Arnaud Lagardère's** fixed remuneration, unchanged since 2009, to **€1,700,000** from €1,140,729.

This increase is part of changes to the structure of the executive corporate officers' remuneration, and in particular in the method used to calculate variable remuneration, with elimination of the benchmark amount of €1,426,000, unrelated to the amount of fixed remuneration.

At its meeting of 27 February 2024, the Board of Directors, on the recommendation of the Appointments, Remuneration and CSR Committee, considered that the changes to the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer's remuneration structure are (i) aligned with the practices observed in a panel of French and international companies operating in the same business sectors, but also that they take into

account (ii) Arnaud Lagardère's work during the strategic changes to the Company following Vivendi SE's takeover, as well as (iii) the fact that Arnaud Lagardère does not receive any long-term remuneration through free share grants.

Annual variable remuneration

At its meeting of 27 February 2024, the Board of Directors, on the recommendation of the Appointments, Remuneration and CSR Committee, decided that the variable portion of Arnaud Lagardère's remuneration would represent 120% of his gross fixed remuneration if the target level of the performance criteria was met, and that it could not exceed 150% of his annual fixed remuneration if the targets were exceeded.

Payment of variable remuneration is contingent on the approval of the General Meeting to be called to approve the financial statements for the year ending 31 December 2024.

Arnaud Lagardère's annual fixed and variable remuneration as approved for 2024 will also be reduced, where applicable, by the respective gross amounts of the fixed and variable remuneration received for 2024 in his capacity as Managing Partner of Lagardère Radio SCA.

Summary of the annual variable remuneration of the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

	Trigger level (% of fixed remuneration)	Target level (% of fixed remuneration)	Maximum level (% of fixed remuneration)	Weighting (% of annual variable remuneration)
Quantitative financial criteria	0%	84%	105%	
Free cash flow	0%	36%	45%	70%
Recurring operating profit of fully consolidated companies	0%	30%	37.5%	
Operating margin	0%	18%	22.5%	
Quantitative CSR criteria	0%	18%	22.5%	
Carbon emissions	0%	7.2%	9%	15%
EcoVadis assessment	0%	7.2%	9%	
Proportion of women top executives	0%	3.6%	4.5%	
Qualitative criteria	0%	18%	22.5%	
Rollout of strategic plan	0%	9%	11.25%	15%
Quality of governance and management	0%	9%	11.25%	
Total	0%	120%	150%	100%


Long-term remuneration – performance share awards

Arnaud Lagardère, who is a significant shareholder of the Company, does not receive any free share awards or other share options, as his stake in the Company automatically guarantees that his actions over the long term will be closely aligned with the interests of shareholders, of which he is one.

Remuneration awarded for duties as a director

The Chairman and Chief Executive Officer is remunerated for his role as director and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Lagardère SA. The terms and conditions of this remuneration are described in section 3.6 below.

4. Specific application of the 2024 remuneration policy to Pierre Leroy, Deputy Chief Executive Officer



Fixed remuneration

Pierre Leroy, as Deputy Chief Executive Officer, receives **€1,474,000** in annual fixed remuneration, unchanged since 2011.

Variable remuneration

At its meeting of 27 February 2024, the Board of Directors, on the recommendation of the

Appointments, Remuneration and CSR Committee, decided that the variable portion of Pierre Leroy's remuneration would represent 60% of his gross fixed remuneration if the target level of the performance criteria was met, and that it could not exceed 75% of his annual fixed remuneration if the targets were exceeded.

Payment of variable remuneration is contingent on the approval of the General Meeting to be called to approve the financial statements for the year ending 31 December 2024.

Summary of the annual variable remuneration of the Deputy Chief Executive Officer

	Trigger level (% of fixed remuneration)	Target level (% of fixed remuneration)	Maximum level (% of fixed remuneration)	Weighting (% of annual variable portion)
Quantitative financial criteria	0%	42%	52.5%	70%
Free cash flow	0%	18%	22.5%	
Recurring operating profit of fully consolidated companies	0%	15%	18.75%	
Operating margin	0%	9%	11.25%	
Quantitative CSR criteria	0%	9%	11.25%	15%
Carbon emissions	0%	3.6%	4.5%	
EcoVadis assessment	0%	3.6%	4.5%	
Proportion of women top executives	0%	1.8%	2.25%	
Qualitative criteria	0%	9%	11.25%	15%
Rollout of strategic plan	0%	4.5%	5.625%	
Quality of governance and management	0%	4.5%	5.625%	
Total	0%	60%	75%	100%

Long-term remuneration – performance share awards

Pierre Leroy is awarded performance shares on a yearly basis:

- ▶ the value of the performance share rights awarded each year to the Deputy Chief Executive Officer may not exceed one-third of their total remuneration for the previous year;
- ▶ furthermore, pursuant to the authorisation given by the Company's shareholders, the performance shares awarded yearly to the Deputy Chief Executive Officer may not exceed 0.025% of the number of shares comprising the Company's share capital. This cap has not been revised since 2009.

Remuneration awarded for duties as a Board Advisor (censeur)

Pierre Leroy may receive remuneration for his duties as an Advisor to the Board of Directors. The terms and conditions of this remuneration are set out in section 3.6 below.

Termination benefits

As Pierre Leroy is an employee, he may be eligible for benefits in certain cases of contract termination, pursuant to the applicable laws, regulations and collective bargaining agreements. In all circumstances, any benefits paid to the executive corporate officers may not exceed the cap of two years' worth of fixed and variable remuneration recommended in the Afep-Medef Corporate Governance Code.